COMMENTS

Constitutional Limitations on State Long
Arm Jurisdiction
In InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,' the Supreme Court
defined due process limitations on state jurisdiction over nonresidents in terms of the "fair" result on the merits of each case, 2 rejecting the application of fixed rules.3 This emphasis has led the
courts to use a balancing test in determining whether jurisdiction
over a nonresident violates due process.4 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,5 however, the Court recently suggested
that due process is provided only if persons can predict with some
certainty where their conduct "will and will not render them liable
to suit." 6

Predictable results require fixed rules and principles that define the constitutional limits of state long arm jurisdiction. 7 This
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

Id. at 316 (minimum contacts requirement ensures that maintenance of the suit "does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' ") (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
3 326 U.S. at 319 ("It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line
between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those
which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."). See also In-Flight Devices
Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1972); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IMI.2d 432, 440, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961).
" See text and notes at notes 21-28 infra.
5 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
1 Id. at 297 ("The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the 'orderly administration of the
laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit.") (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). See also Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm JurisdictionFinally
Exceeds its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v.
Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REV. 407, 430-32 (1980) (World-Wide rejected the traditional balancing
approach in favor of a "bright line" test).
' The Supreme Court's inability to devise a set of rules for universal application is
highlighted by the divisions on the Court in its recent decisions on the issue. Justice White
wrote for the majority in World-Wide, yet he joined Justice Brennan's dissent in Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978). Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion in
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comment attempts to set forth such a set of principles to govern
the exercise of long arm jurisdiction." Rejecting the balancing approach, it first outlines the three requirements that ensure adequate due process protection to nonresident defendants. These
minimum requirements-causation, notice, and relevance-allow
states wide latitude in asserting long arm jurisdiction. Using commercial cases as an illustration, the comment then considers additional limitations on long arm jurisdiction mandated by other provisions of the Constitution and necessary because of the nature of
the defendant's underlying conduct.
I.

A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR JURISDICTIONAL

ANALYSIS

A.

Minimum Contacts and State Long Arm Statutes

The due process clause permits a state to exercise jurisdiction
only where "minimum contacts" exist between the defendant and
the forum.' This requirement protects a defendant from "the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum" 10 by ensuring
that it is "reasonable" to require him to defend the suit in the forum state.1 1 The minimum contacts rule also protects the "orderly
administration of the laws ' 12 by preventing states from "reach[ing]
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
1' 3
sovereigns in a federal system.
By enacting a long arm statute, a state exercises its constitutional prerogative to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who have
minimum contacts with it. These statutes provide for limited personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose actions have caused injuries within the state.1 4 Jurisdiction is specific, 5 extending only to
Kulko and dissented in World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 313. Justice Brennan dissented in both
cases, 444 U.S. at 299; 436 U.S. at 101. Justice Powell was with the majority in World-Wide
and the dissenters in Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101. Justice Blackmun was in the majority in Kulko
and dissented in World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 313. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens,
Rehnquist, and Stewart voted with the majority in both cases.
8 On the nature of long arm jurisdiction, see text and notes at notes 14-16 infra.
" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) (minimum contacts analysis focuses on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
10 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
2 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
iS World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
" Long arm statutes vary in breadth. The California statute, for example, provides that
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causes of action related to the in-state effects of a defendant's
activities."6
B.

A Balancing Test Versus Fixed Rules

It generally is agreed that a state cannot assert jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant unless at least three conditions are
17
satisfied: the defendant must have caused an effect in the forum,
he must have had fair notice at the time of his act that it would
cause an effect in the forum,18 and that effect must be related to
"[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
Statutes in most states are more restrictive, typically enumerating specific events and transactions-doing business in the state, committing a tort or causing a tortious effect in the
state, owning property in the state-and providing that causes of action arising from these
acts support personal jurisdiction over nonresidents involved in them. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAw § 302 (McKinney 1972). In states that specify particular contacts, two questions
must be answered when jurisdiction is asserted under a long arm statute: whether the contact falls within the scope of the statute, and if so, whether the state's exercise of jurisdiction is constitutional. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.14 (2d ed. 1977). The
practical differences between the two approaches may be slight. The Minnesota statute
specifies particular contacts, MINN. STAT. REV. § 543.19 (West Supp. 1980), but has been
interpreted "to assert in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent
consistent with due-process." Marquette Nat'l Bank v. Norris, 270 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.
1978).
15 The rules and principles outlined in this comment are irrelevant to determining
whether a state may assert general jurisdiction over a defendant. In deciding this question,
the court must examine the entire relationship between the defendant and the forum, not
just the elements of that relationship connected to the particular cause of action. See von
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1121, 1144-45 (1966).
16 On the nature of long arm jurisdiction, see generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H.
KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-CoMMENTS-QuEsTIONs 528-58 (2d ed. 1975); F. JAMES & G.
HAZARD, supra note 14, § 12.14; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]; R. WEINTRAUB, COMmENTARY ON TE CoNFLir OF LAWS
§§ 4.7-.21 (2d ed. 1980); Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due ProcessLimitations on State
Court Jurisdiction,1980 Sup. CT. REv. 77; Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and
the Jurisdictionof State Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdictionin Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Woods,
Pennoyer's Demise: PersonalJurisdictionAfter Shaffer and Kulko and a Modest Prediction on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L. REv. 861 (1978); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,73 HARv. L. Rav. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Developments]; Note, Long-Arm Jurisdictionin Commercial Litigation:When is a Contract a Contact?, 61 B.U.L. Rxv. 375 (1981); Note, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson: A Limit to the Expansion of Long-Arm Jurisdiction,69 CALI. L. REv. 611 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as California Note]; Comment, Federalism, Due Process and Minimum
Contacts: World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1341 (1980).
1? See text and notes at notes 48-66 infra.
18 See text and notes at notes 67-85 infra.
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the cause of action. 19 A few courts have viewed these three prerequisites as the only limitations on the reach of state long arm

statutes.20
The consensus among courts2 1 and commentators,2 2 however,
is that a balancing test should be used to determine whether a
state may extend its long arm to a particular defendant. Typically,
the defendant's interest in not being unfairly haled before a foreign court2" is balanced against the plaintiff's interest in his chosen
forum, 4 the judicial system's interest in having the suit tried in
the forum state,2 5 and the forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction.2 6 Some advocates of balancing propose a two-step approach
whereby a court first determines whether a defendant knowingly
caused a relevant event to occur within the forum; if he did, the
court then balances the factors outlined above to determine the
"fairness" of asserting jurisdiction. 7 Others propose forgoing the

19 See text and notes at notes 86-91 infra. The relevance requirement serves a purpose
more akin to federalism than fairness, permitting jurisdiction only where an event gives the
state a legitimate interest in the cause of action. See Woods, supra note 16, at 883; Comment, supra note 16, at 1345-49. See also Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 84.
20 See Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P&C Food Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977);
Duple Motor Bodies, Ltd. v. Hollingsworth, 417 F.2d 231, 235 (9th Cir. 1969); Electro-Craft
Corp. v. Maxwell Elecs. Corp., 417 F.2d 365, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1969). See also cases cited
infra note 35.
"' In addition to the Supreme Court cases cited at notes 23-26 infra, see, for example,
Nova Biomedical Corp. v. Moller, 629 F.2d 190, 193 n.3 (1st Cir. 1980); Caesar's World, Inc.
v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1974); Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287,
290 n.7 (9th Cir. 1972); Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D. I1. 1980);
Blamey v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1070 (1978).
22 See, e.g., RESTATEmENT, supra note 16, § 37 caveat a, para. 4 (1971); Carrington &
Martin, supra note 16, at 230-31; Woods, supra note 16, at 890-98; Developments, supra
note 16, at 924-25.
23 This factor is "always a primary concern." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
2' See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
211 n.37 (1977). Some have suggested that jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant
with no forum contacts at all if the plaintiff has no alternative forum in which to sue the
defendant. See Brihmayer, supra note 16, at 108-10; Woods, supra note 16, at 894; California
Note, supra note 16, at 629-30.
25 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (court must balance "the quality
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure"); Woods, supra note 16, at
893-94.
" See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Carrington &
Martin, supra note 16, at 233-37; Woods, supra note 16, at 893; California Note, supra note
16, at 630; Comment, supra note 16, at 1345-49. See also cases discussed infra note 39.
27 See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Mach. Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1110
(5th Cir. 1976); Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
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initial inquiry; once the court has determined that the defendant
caused a relevant effect in the forum, it uses balancing alone to
decide whether to assert jurisdiction.2
The balancing approach has two fundamental flaws. First, because it is unpredictable, it offers no guidance to persons seeking
to avoid being subject to a state's jurisdiction. 29 Each decision is
too fact-bound for general application, and the weight given to
each competing variable is left to the discretion of individual
judges. Given this discretion, state courts often resolve close cases
in their own favor, thereby steadily and inappropriately expanding
jurisdiction.3 0 Moreover, because the balancing approach considers
factors the defendant can neither anticipate nor control, it is impossible for individuals to predict with any certainty where their
conduct will render them subject to suit.3 1 For example, some

nied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974); Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1974); Woods,
supra note 16, at 862, 881-82; cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37 caveat a (court should
automatically assert jurisdiction if the defendant intentionally caused an effect in the forum, but the balancing test applies if the defendant could only have reasonably anticipated
that his conduct would affect the forum).
28 See, e.g., Carrington & Martin, supra note 16, at 230. Advocates of this approach
have argued that in products liability actions, jurisdiction should be asserted over a manufacturer even if he could not foresee the presence of his product in the forum. See Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 259-60, 413 P.2d 732, 737-38 (1966); Comment,
In Personam Jurisdictionover Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions,
63 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1031-32 (1965).
29 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (due process "gives a degree of predictability to the legal system"). World-Wide seems to move away
from traditional balancing because of its unpredictability. Although the Court acknovledged
the competing variables in due process analysis, id. at 292, it focused on the defendant's
contacts with the forum, finding "a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a
necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction," id. at 295. Justice Brennan
in dissent criticized the Court for not weighing other factors and noted that the Court previously had "declined to establish a mechanical test based on the quantum of contacts between a State and the defendant. . . ." Id. at 300 (construing Kulko v. Superior Court, 436
U.S. 84, 92 (1978)). See generally Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-89 (1976) (distinguishing two different legal methods: the
application of general rules, which has the advantage of certainty, and the use of an equitable standard to produce ad hoc decisions); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 315, 316 (1972) (contrasting rules, which provide certainty and predictability, with "approach," which weighs competing factors).
" Louis, supra note 6, at 430-32. But see Jay, Minimum ContactsAs A Unified Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction:A Reappraisal,59 N.C.L. REv. 429, 457-58 (1981) (state courts
have exercised restraint in defining the proper reach of the long arm).
31 Even proponents of balancing admit that predictability is impossible. California
Note, supra note 16, at 630 ("One cannot deny that the balancing approach grants the
courts a great deal of discretion. In addition, it creates a sizeable amount of uncertainty due
to the inconsistencies that are liable to result from a court's balancing of various
considerations.").
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courts have suggested considering the plaintiff's indigency and inability to travel to sue the defendant elsewhere.3 2 Because defendants cannot anticipate the wealth of potential plaintiffs, such equitable concerns undermine predictability.
The second flaw of the balancing approach is that the factors
balanced have no constitutional relevance. A plaintiff's poverty, for
example, has no apparent connection to the constitutional question
of the defendant's amenability to suit.3 3 Similarly, variations on
the reach of long arm jurisdiction that are based on the character
of the defendant's conduct" are inconsistent with principled due
process analysis. Where a defendant's conduct is intentionally tortious or of little social value, courts do not hesitate to assert jurisdiction if the minimum due process requirements of causation, notice, and relevance are met. 5 Although protection of some conduct
might be compelled by other constitutional provisions,3 the due
process clause alone does not support variations on jurisdiction

s

See, e.g., Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 260, 413 P.2d 732,

738 (1966).
3$ See Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1001 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
34 Such variation is a common theme among courts and commentators. For example,
the Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978), asserted that the
"effects test" of the RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37, might be applicable when the defendant's conduct was commercial or tortious, but concluded that it was not applicable when
the defendant's act was sending his daughter to the forum state to live with her mother. See
Note, Fairnessor Federalismin Supreme Court Minimum Contact Analysis?: World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1341, 1354 (1980) (Kulko was concerned with the nature and quality of the defendant's activity). See also Davis v. St. PaulMercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 649 (4th Cir. 1961); Hunt v. Nevada State Bank, 285
Minn. 77, 110-12, 172 N.W.2d 292, 311-12 (1969) (extent of required contacts varies among
libel, tort, and contract actions), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1010 (1970); State ex rel. Sperandio
v. Clymer, 581 S.W.2d 377, 382 & n.5 (Mo. 1979) ("effects test" is applicable only when a
defendant's underlying activity was wrongful); Carrington & Martin, supra note 16, at 23334, 240-42 (proper reach of long arm should be determined in part by the value of the
defendant's underlying conduct); Reese & Gaiston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences
as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction,44 IowA L. REv. 249, 262-63 (1959) (long arm should
extend most extensively where a defendant's underlying activity is inherently dangerous).
'5 See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500-01 (1971) (dictum)
(state court would have jurisdiction over foreign polluter whose emissions affected state);
Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal Mach. Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1976);
Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1974) (if defendant intentionally sent false
and misleading information into the forum, jurisdiction may be asserted without further
analysis); Gemini Enterprises, Inc. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564
(M.D.N.C. 1979) (conspirator who knew, or should have known, that coconspirator would
commit conspiratorial acts in the forum is subject to its jurisdiction); J.E.M. Corp. v. McClellan, 462 F. Supp. 1246, 1255 (D. Kan. 1978) (alleged misrepresentation in long-distance
telephone call into state subjects caller to the state's jurisdiction).
' See text and notes at notes 46-47, 92-116 infra.
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that depend on the perceived social utility of the defendant's
activities.
Considerations of general convenience-the plaintiff's, the defendant's, and the judicial system's-also lack constitutional foundation. Such considerations are instead the cornerstone of the discretionary doctrine of forum non conveniens,
which is unrelated to
87
a forum's power over a defendant.
The weight of the forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction also
is irrelevant to its power to do so. Within constitutional bounds, a
state legislature has the right to decide which actions causing instate effects it wishes to regulate in its courts."8 When a court restricts the reach of a state's long arm statute on the ground that
the state has an insufficient interest in asserting jurisdiction, 9 it
usurps that right by substituting its judgment for that of the
state's legislature.
Finally, the factor most commonly invoked in balancing analyses-a state's interest in providing its own residents with a
forum 4q-is

also of doubtful constitutional legitimacy. The priv-

ileges and immunities clause of article IV41 prohibits state discrimination against the citizens of other states. Jurisdictional policies that favor residents arguably constitute just such forbidden
discrimination. 2
37 Under this doctrine, dismissal is appropriate when the suit may be brought in an-

other forum, and either the defendant's convenience far outweighs that of the plaintiff or
"trial in the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's

own administrative and legal problems." Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.
518, 524 (1947). The doctrine applies only where jurisdiction and venue are proper in the
original forum. See generally F. JAws & G. HAZARD, supra note 14, § 12.29; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 16, § 84.
3
See Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 831-32, 345 P.2d 921, 925 (1959); Nelson v. Miller, 11 IMI.2d 378, 387, 143 N.E.2d 673, 678 (1957).
" See, e.g., Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1972) (denying jurisdiction
over out-of-state physicians who rendered medical services because forum's interest in not
deterring out-of-state physicians from providing care was greater than its interest in redressing injury); Associated Am. Artists, Inc. v. Brevard Community College, 508 F. Supp.
292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying jurisdiction over defendant who rented goods from resident plaintiff in part because of forum's interest in not deterring persons from dealing with
New York businesses).
40 See Caesar's World, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., 498 F.2d 1176, 1180 (8th Cir. 1974);
California Note, supra note 16, at 626, 630; Comment, supra note 16, at 1346.
41 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
42 See, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)
(access to other states' courts is protected by the privileges and immunities clause); Simson,
DiscriminationAgainst Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 398-99 (1979). See also Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 107.
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If the purpose of due process protection is to ensure that persons can avoid suits in foreign states, 48 unpredictable and nonconstitutionally-based balancing tests should be rejected. Due process
analysis should be governed instead by a body of fixed rules. Part
II outlines a uniform body of rules governing causation, notice, and
relevance that defines the extent of an individual's protection from
a foreign state's authority and, by implication, the extent to which
a state can protect itself from foreign individuals' acts that will
affect it. Further restrictions on jurisdiction are legitimate only
when there is a separate constitutional limitation on the state's
power to regulate the defendant's underlying conduct.
This analysis still requires that courts consider the nature of
the defendants' activities, 4 but it provides a constitutional basis
for doing so. Thus, additional restraints imposed in commercial
cases, for example, should not be based on fairness to the defendant, 5 for he had the opportunity to protect himself from the au43 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Professor Martin Redish has offered an alternative interpretation of the purpose of due process safeguards, arguing that "the only concern of a principled due process jurisdictional analysis
should be the avoidance of inconvenience to the defendant." Redish, Due Process,Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction:A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112, 1137
(1981).
Redish's analysis goes both too far and not far enough. If he is correct, the fifth amendment's due process clause should limit federal jurisdiction to forums convenient for the defendant, and the fourteenth amendment's due process clause should limit state jurisdiction
over its residents to convenient localities within the state. Yet Congress has authorized nationwide service of process for certain actions in the federal courts, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(1976) (interpleader), and the Supreme Court in dictum noted Congress's power to do so in
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946). Moreover, no court has
ever read the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as prohibiting a state from forcing
its residents to litigate in an inconvenient state court. See R. WmNmAu, supra note 16, §
4.7, at 17-18 ("Within the state ... there is, so far as due process is concerned, statewide
jurisdiction once the required state nexus is found."). See also Aguchak v. Montgomery
Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1974). Furthermore, the due process clause is not concerned solely with convenience. As the Court noted in World-Wide, even where it is convenient for a defendant to litigate in a foreign forum, a state cannot assert jurisdiction over
him if he has no contacts with it. 444 U.S. at 294.
The principle of jurisdictional due process proposed here preserves the territorial jurisdiction rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Under the proposed principle, a person
can avoid a foreign state's jurisdiction by forgoing acts that he anticipates will cause an
effect there. The principle also preserves for states the power, recognized in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), to require persons who knowingly cause effects in the state to consent to amenability to suit for those acts.
44 For courts that have done so, see cases cited supra note 34.
45 See, e.g., Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596,
603 n.12 (7th Cir. 1979) (possibility of discouraging interstate transactions underscores unfairness of asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state defendant who has only attenuated contractual links with forum), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[49:156

thority of the foreign state; nor should the restraints be based on
the forum state's lack of interest in asserting jurisdiction over the
defendant,4 for there are many reasons why a state might want to
regulate commercial conduct that affects it. Rather, the restrictions
should be justified by constitutional limitations on a state's power
to regulate interstate commerce. 47 Rules implementing this analysis are developed in part III.
This approach-fixing uniform minimum due process requirements and adding to them only where required by other constitutional provisions-serves several important purposes. It ensures
that state jurisdiction is limited only by the Constitution's restrictions, subject to which a state should be free to regulate in its
courts whatever foreign acts it wishes. Moreover, it preserves a uniform body of due process standards, thereby facilitating predictability of results; at the same time, it provides jurisdictional rules
that are flexible in their application.
II. DUE

PROCESS REQUIREMENTS: CAUSATION, NOTICE, AND
RELEVANCE

A. Causation
Due process requires that a nonresident defendant have
caused an effect in the forum state before the state may assert jurisdiction over him.48 Causation is less a definable phenomenon
than a label attached to an aggregation of common sense notions.
4' See cases cited supra note 39.
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 authorizes Congress "[tlo regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . ." On the nature of negative commerce

clause analysis, see text and notes at notes 94-96 infra.
48 RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37 ("A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect
to causes of action arising from these effects...."). See Reese & Galston, supra note 34, at
260-63.
An intriguing conceptual question, albeit one that rarely arises in practice, is whether
the defendant can be held responsible for an event caused by his failure to act. In Jahner v.
Jacob, 252 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 1977), the court held that the due process causation requirement is satisfied only by a voluntary act. Jurisdiction therefore could not be asserted over
two defendants who had received misappropriated property mailed from North Dakota, because no voluntary act tied them to the misappropriation or to the mailing.
Although the result in Jahnermay be correct, the court stated the governing principle
too broadly. If a defendant realized that his failure to act would cause an event, and if he
was able to prevent the occurrence of that event, he had an opportunity to avoid being
liable to suit in the forum state. Therefore, the state could fairly assert jurisdiction over
him. The real problem is determining when a state may impose a duty to act on out-ofstaters.
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Typical examples include a defendant shooting someone in the forum state while standing in an adjacent state"9 and a defendant
sending an injurious product into the state.5
Most difficulties in establishing causation arise when the defendant did not cause the effect directly. There is no conceptual
difficulty with attributing another person's actions to the defendant if he actually or constructively requested them and they are
to his benefit. Thus, for jurisdictional purposes, a conspirator's actions are attributed to his coconspirators, 1 an agent's actions are
attributed to his principal, 52 and a party's contractual performance

"

See RESTATEMNT, supra note 16, § 37 caveat a, para. 3.
" See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). Causation is not always so straightforward. Consider Block Indus. v.
DHJ Indus., Inc., 495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974), a products liability action in which the
defendant filed third-party complaints against the four fabric manufacturers from whom it
had purchased fabric resembling the material that went into the plaintiff's shirt. The record
showed only that the injurious fabric had come from one of the defendants, but not which
one. Jurisdiction therefore was denied over all four because no single defendant had been
connected to the plaintiff's injury.
0' See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1342-44
(2d Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Mack 507 F. Supp. 345, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Gemini Enterprises,
Inc. v. WFMY Television Corp., 470 F. Supp. 559, 564 (M.D.N.C. 1979); McLaughlin v.
Copeland, 435 F. Supp. 513, 529-32 (D. Md. 1977); Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692,
696 (D.D.C. 1973). But see I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mannesmann Pipe & Steel Corp., 408 F. Supp.
1023, 1024 (D. Minn. 1976) (antitrust venue case rejecting conspiracy theory).
The reluctance to assert jurisdiction in cases of alleged conspiracy results largely from
fear that plaintiffs will use cursory allegations of conspiracy to drag defendants into inconvenient forums. See Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Casad, Long Arm and Convenient Forum, 20 KAN. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1971), suggests treating
the problem as one of proof: if the plaintiff alleges enough to show that he has a good
chance of proving conspiracy, the court should assert jurisdiction. This advice was followed
in Professional Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Roussel, 445 F. Supp. 687, 696-97 (D. Kan. 1978)
(noting that suit would be dismissed if subsequent discovery did not support the allegations). Cf. Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 682 (1st Cir. 1980) (no jurisdiction on conspiracy
theory where plaintiff's allegations are imprecise and unsupported).
52 See, e.g., Nelson v. Miller, 11 IM. 2d 378, 390-91, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957). The
defendant is not subject to the forum's jurisdiction, however, if his agent caused the injury
while acting outside the scope of the agency. See, e.g., Haker v. Southwestern Ry., 176
Mont. 364, 374, 578 P.2d 724, 728-29 (1978). It is unsettled whether jurisdiction over the
defendant may be based on another's act in the forum where the defendant subsequently
ratified that act. Compare Plaza Realty Investors Co. v. Bailey, 484 F. Supp. 335, 346-48
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (ratification insufficient) with State ex rel. Farmland Indus. Inc. v. Elliott,
560 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. 1977) (ratification sufficient).
The defendant can be deemed jurisdictionally responsible for another's act even though
no formal agency relationship exists between the two. All that usually is required is that the
defendant have requested the act and that it be for his benefit. See Galgay v. Bulletin Co.,
504 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (2d Cir. 1974) (New York long arm statute does not require formal
agency relationship to impute activity in forum state to out-of-state defendant); Barer v.
Goldberg, 20 Wash. App. 472, 478-81, 582 P.2d 808, 872-73 (1978) (husband's in-state ac-
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may be imputed to another party to the contract.5 3
Most courts also recognize that the causation requirement is
satisfied when an independent actor transmits the effects of the
defendant's actions to the forum. 54 Many commentators 5 and
courts,5 8 however, have asserted that this principle should not ex-

tions for benefit of the marriage are grounds for asserting jurisdiction over wife). It therefore
has been held that a corporate agent was an agent of the defendant corporate officer when
the agent's acts were requested by the officer and they inured to his benefit and not to the
corporation's. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 919 (1966); cf. Thames v. Gunter-Dunn Inc., 373 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala. 1979) (acts of
corporate agent not imputed to corporate officer who requested them when acts were to the
benefit of the corporation). Similarly, a corporate subsidiary will be deemed an agent of its
parent if the subsidiary acts at the behest of the parent and for its benefit. E.g., Finance Co.
of Am. v. BankAmerica Corp., 493 F. Supp. 895, 907 (D. Md. 1980). Cf. Biltmoor Moving &
Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 202, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1979) (defendant general contractor subject to suit in forum because of independent subcontractor's performance there).
53 See, e.g., Biltmoor Moving & Storage Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 606 F.2d 202, 206-08 (7th
Cir. 1979).
"See Reese & Galston, supra note 34, at 262. The Supreme Court implicitly endorsed
this principle when it cited Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), with approval in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980). In Gray, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction over an
out-of-state manufacturer even though its product had been brought into the forum by a
purchaser who was not under the control of the manufacturer. 22 Ill. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d
at 766. See also Hapner v. Rolf Brauchli, Inc., 404 Mich. 160, 177, 273 N.W.2d 822, 827
(1978) (Moody, J., dissenting).
Some courts have argued to the contrary. See, e.g., W.G. Bush & Co. v. Sioux City &
New Orleans Barge Lines, 474 F. Supp. 537, 543 (M.D. Tenn. 1977) (repair company had no
control over eventual location of repaired barge); Louis Marx & Co. v. Fuji Seiko Co., 453 F.
Supp. 385, 390-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant had no control over putative agent); Mueller
v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D. Minn. 1959) (manufacturer had no control over
location of product). The notice requirement, however, protects against any unfairness in
asserting jurisdiction when the effect is transmitted by a third party. See text and notes at
notes 67-69 infra.
5 See, e.g., Brilmayer, supranote 16, at 93-94; Currie, supra note 16, at 555-56; Woods,
supra note 16, at 891-92.
" For example, several courts have held that a merchant is not responsible for the
presence of his product in the forum when it was the plaintiff who took it there. See, e.g.,
Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D. Minn. 1959); Dunn v. Upjohn Co., 350
So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Cf. Craig v. General Finance Corp., 504 F. Supp.
1033 (D. Md. 1980) (no jurisdiction over defendant in defamation action where plaintiff
moved to forum and defendant attempted to collect preexisting debt by informing plaintiff's
new employer of the debt). But cf. Lachman v. Bank of La., 510 F. Supp. 753, 757 (N.D.
Ohio 1981) (jurisdiction asserted over defendant credit card company because it permitted
plaintiff to continue using card after he moved to the forum).
Numerous courts have refused to assert jurisdiction over out-of-state physicians whose
contacts with the forum were limited to treatment of travelling patients who resided in the
forum. See, e.g., Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1972); Chancellor v. Lawrence, 501 F. Supp. 997, 1001-02 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Jackson v. Wileman, 468 F. Supp. 822, 82425 (W.D. Ky. 1979); Woodward v. Keenan, 79 Mich. App. 543, 547-48, 261 N.W.2d 80, 82-83
(1977) (per curiam).
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tend to situations where that actor is the plaintiff. 7 It might be
argued that two recent Supreme Court decisions support this re8 the Court
strictive causal approach. In Kulko v. Superior Court,5
held that California could not assert jurisdiction in an action for
child support over a New York father who had allowed his daughter to go to California to live with her mother.59 In World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," the Court held that Oklahoma
could not assert jurisdiction in a products liability action over a
New York automobile dealer when the plaintiff bought a car in
New York and was injured in Oklahoma.61 Although neither opinion invoked the rationale that the plaintiff created the contact,
both opinions suggest that the Court thought it relevant that the
plaintiff had transmitted the effect of the defendant's out-of-state
Similarly, courts have commonly held that a defendant may not be sued in the forum
merely because the plaintiff's business suffered economic loss there as a result of the defendant's conduct elsewhere. They reason that the defendant's acts had an effect in the forum
only because the plaintiff chose to locate its business there. See, e.g., Friedr. Zoellner Corp.
v. Texas Metals Co., 396 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1968) (construing New York statute); American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 433 (2d Cir.
1971) (same). Cf. Hilferty v. Neesan, 506 F. Supp. 218, 220 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (no jurisdiction
where the only events in the forum were plaintiff's residual pain and suffering for injury
incurred elsewhere); Leaks v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 413, 415-17 (D.D.C. 1976) (same).
It also has been held that a buyer is not subject to suit in the seller's home state where
his contacts with the forum were induced by the seller's advertising in the buyer's state.
See, e.g., Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 254-55, 342 P.2d 871, 874 (1959). Where the
defendant is the siren, jurisdiction exists even where the plaintiff created the contact, because the defendant enticed him into doing just that. See Woodward v. Keenan, 79 Mich.
App. 543, 548-50, 261 N.W.2d 80, 83 (1977) (subjecting doctors who advertise or solicit
across state lines to long arm jurisdiction).
See also the New York courts' curious refusal to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
on the basis of his agent's activities in New York if the agent is the plaintiff. Parke-Bernet
Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 19 n.2, 256 N.E.2d 506, 509 n.2, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337,
341 n.2 (1970). For criticism of this doctrine, see Note, New York's Long-Arm Jurisdiction:
The Case for the Agent-Plaintiff, 41 BROOKLYN L. Rav. 625, 657-64 (1975).
s7This rule probably is based on vague notions of fairness and an unwillingness to hold
the defendant responsible for the plaintiff's conduct. See Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v.
Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596, 602-03 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907
(1980). Similar concerns of fairness underlie the rule that a court should not exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who was tricked into the forum by the plaintiff, see, e.g., Wyman v.
Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 664 (1938), and the rule that a
court should not exercise in rem jurisdiction when the plaintiff brought the defendant's res
into the forum to obtain jurisdiction over him, see, e.g., Abel v. Smith, 151 Va. 568, 577-79,
144 S.E. 616, 619 (Spec. Ct. App. 1928).
58 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
5 Id. at 86-90.
40 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
81 Id. at 287.
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act to the forum state. 2
From a causal standpoint, however, there is no principled justification for treating plaintiffs differently from other persons who
transmit effects. To the extent that it might be unfair to assert
jurisdiction, the requirement of fair notice, which ensures that the
defendant had an opportunity to take precautions to avoid being
subject to suit,63 assures sufficient protection. The fact that the
plaintiff rather than the defendant or a third party created the
contact is irrelevant to the defendant's ability to take protective
measures if he perceives the risk. 4
Moreover, excluding plaintiff-created contacts can produce absurd results. In a recent Alaska products liability action, 5 for example, the defendant, a local merchant, filed a third-party complaint against the out-of-state manufacturer of the injurious
product. The manufacturer argued that it should not be subject to
jurisdiction because the merchant was responsible for the presence
of the product in Alaska. Had that argument been accepted, the
manufacturer would have been subject to jurisdiction if the original plaintiff sued it directly, because the effect was transmitted by
the middleman merchant; the manufacturer would not have been
amenable to suit there if the local merchant sought to impose the
same liability. 6

62

In Kulko, the Court stated:

Finally, basic considerations of fairness point decisively in favor of appellant's State of
domicile as the proper forum for adjudication of this case, whatever the merits of appellee's underlying claim. It is appellant who has remained in the State of the marital
domicile, whereas it is appellee who has moved across the continent.
436 U.S. at 97. In World-Wide, the Court stated that "[i]t is foreseeable that the purchasers
of automobiles sold by [the defendants] may take them to Oklahoma. But the mere 'unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of a contact with the forum State."' 444 U.S. at 298 (quoting Hanson
v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Hanson does not support the rule discussed here,
however. In that case, it was the testator who created the defendant trustee's contact with
the forum state, not the plaintiff beneficiaries. 357 U.S. at 238-39.
63 See text and notes at notes 67-69 infra.
For example, the defendant in Kulko could have refused to permit his daughter to go
to California. Similarly, if the defendants in World-Wide could have anticipated liability,
they could have taken protective measures or simply refused to sell the automobile. Accord,
Comment, supra note 16, at 1354-55.
85 Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498 (Alaska), cert. denied, 449

U.S. 974 (1980).
66Id. at 502.
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B. Notice
Due process also requires that jurisdiction can be asserted
only over a defendant who could anticipate, ' 7 or who had "fair notice,""' that his out-of-state act would cause an effect in the forum
state.8 9 Courts have struggled with two aspects of the notice requirement: first, of what it is that notice must be had, and second,
whether the defendant must purposefully desire the contact with
the forum state.
Prior to Kulko, it was thought that jurisdiction could be asserted if the defendant reasonably could have foreseen or anticipated that his actions would cause an effect in the forum.70 In that
case, however, the Supreme Court indicated that the defendant
had to be able to anticipate "being 'haled before a [foreign]
court.'

71

Read literally, this language requires that a defendant be

able to anticipate actually being sued in the forum because of the
effect he caused there. 2
'7There is some confusion as to whether the proper standard is foreseeability or anticipation. A number of courts employ the former term. E.g., Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P&C Food
Mkts., Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal.
2d 893, 902, 458 P.2d 57, 64, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 120 (1969). The distinction between foreseeability and anticipation is probably purely semantic. If there is in fact a difference, however,
the anticipation standard seems to have carried the day. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980) ("foreseeability" of product's presence in foreign
state insufficient; defendant must be able to "reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there"). See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d
Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.) ("foreseeability" too low a standard; defendant "must know, or have
a good reason to know, that his conduct will have effects in the [forum] state").
" See Woods, supra note 16, at 885-90. Justice Stevens introduced the term in his
concurring opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217-19 (1977) ("The Due Process
Clause affords protection against 'judgments without notice.'. . . The requirement of fair
notice also, I believe, includes fair warning that a particular activity may subject a person to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign.") (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 324 (1945)).
" See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980); Leasco
Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972); R. WMNTRAUn, supra
note 16, § 4.16, at 161-64. See generally Woods, supra note 16, at 883-89. The standard is
objective. See, e.g., Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 200-01 (5th Cir. 1980).
70 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37; R. WmNTRAUB, supra note 16, § 4.16, at 16162 (foreseeability of consequence or harm in forum essential to satisfaction of due process
requirements).
71 Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1977) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 216 (1977)). This standard was reiterated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
7' See, e.g., Kellan v. Holster, 518 F. Supp. 175, 178 (M.D. Fla. 1981). The rule has been
criticized as circular: jurisdiction over the defendant depends on his foreknowledge of that
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jay, supra note 30, at 443; California Note, supra note 16, at 621.
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Although appropriate in commercial cases, '73 and perhaps
properly applied in Kulko itself, such a rule cannot serve as a general standard for determining jurisdiction. For example, where an
out-of-state defendant intentionally injures someone in the forum,
no court would refuse to assert jurisdiction merely because the defendant had reason to believe the injury would not be discovered
or that the victim would select a different forum in which to sue.74
Such a result could be avoided by interpreting Kulko to require
anticipation of legal liability rather than actual suit on the basis of
that liability.7 5 Even this rule would be too restrictive, however, for
it would not permit a state to reach a defendant who caused a potentially (but not predictably) dangerous effect to occur within it.
For example, where a nonresident defendant loaned his automobile
to a friend who had an accident in the forum,71 a rule requiring
anticipation of legal liability would deny a state jurisdiction over
the defendant unless he could have "reasonably anticipated" the
accident. Generally, it makes sense to define fair notice as anticipa7
tion of an effect rather than anticipation of legal liability."
The fair notice requirement sometimes is made more stringent
by requiring that the defendant have acted "purposefully." The
Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla7 8 so held, and the Court has
reaffirmed this rule consistently without ever defining it.79 It is un-

See text and notes at notes 101, 107-115 infra.
See note 35 supra.
7
"The
Court in World-Wide seemed to equate the "haled into court" language with
being "subject to suit." 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
76 It generally is agreed that jurisdiction exists in these circumstances. See Davis v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 294 F.2d 641, 643-48 (4th Cir. 1961); cf. Worthley v. Rockville
Leasecar, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 185, 187-88 (D. Md. 1971) (airplane).
7 In addition to consistency with precedent, see cases cited supra note 67, two other
considerations support such a reading. First, the Court has never indicated either the genesis or the explanation for the supposed heightened standard. Second, the purpose of the due
process standard set forth in World-Wide, to allow individuals "to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where [it] will and will not render them liable
to suit," 444 U.S. at 297, is fulfilled by the traditional, more expansive standard.
78 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1968) (jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant only if he
"purposefully avails [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws").
79 See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). It has
been suggested that the requirement should be ignored as careless dictum. See Phillips v.
Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 100 Ariz. 251, 256, 413 P.2d 732, 735 (1966); International
Harvester Co. v. Hendrickson Mfg. Co., 249 Ark. 298, 301-03, 459 S.W.2d 62, 64-65 (1970).
But see Comment, supra note 16, at 1355 (if "defendant has met the purposeful affiliation
requirement of Hanson v. Denckla, it has fair notice").
73
74
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clear whether it is the defendant's underlying act or the contact
itself that must have been purposeful. Under the former approach,
a defendant purposefully avails himself of a contact with the forum
state as long as he had fair notice that his act would have an effect
there.8 0 Under this definition, however, Kulko appears to be
wrongly decided. Kulko certainly knew that his child would go to
California, and he should not have been surprised that she took
advantage of benefits provided by the state once she was there. Yet
the Court concluded that Kulko's action was not purposeful.8 1 The
case therefore suggests that the contact itself must be purposeful.
Kulko's act was not purposeful because he neither desired his
daughter's presence in California nor received any personal benefit
from her presence there.82
This concept of purposefulness, emphasizing the contact
rather than the act, has been used by lower courts to justify protection of local merchants who knowingly make sales to customers
from other states, but who generally do little business with persons
from those states." Under this reasoning, a merchant who sells to
an occasional nonresident customer may know that his product is
going to a foreign state, but because his business does not depend
on foreign sales, he has no interest in the product's presence there.
Although the purposefulness requirement seems to achieve the
correct result in Kulko and the local merchant cases, jurisdictional
so See Poyner v. Erma Werke GmbH, 618 F.2d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir. 1980) ("purposeful"

if defendant knew his actions would have an effect in the forum state), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 841 (1981); King v. Halley Chevrolet Co., 462 F.2d 63, 67 & n.4, 68 (6th Cir. 1972)
("purposeful" if defendant could foresee that his actions would have an effect in the forum
state).
In World-Wide, Justice White intimated that the point of the purposeful availment
rule was to ensure that the defendant had fair notice that his act might render him liable to
suit in the forum state: "When a corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State,'. . . it has clear notice that it is subject to suit
there and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation. . . ." 444 U.S. at 297 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1968)). See also Woods, supra note 16, at 885.
81 436 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1978). The Court emphasized that any benefits of California residency went to the child rather than her father and that Kulko did not purposefully seek any
benefits from his daughter's contacts.
9' Id. at 94 n.7.
83 See, e.g., Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 134, 156-57, 273 N.W.2d
811, 820-21 (1978) ("The generating cause is not the [defendant's] desire to enlarge his business into Michigan, but, rather, the Michigan customer's desire to do business with the
[defendant]. A localized business.., does not depend on multi-state distribution to generate volume. Out-of-state effects are but an incident of the business."); State ex rel. Sperandio v. Clymer, 581 S.W.2d 377, 382-83 (Mo. 1979); Pellegrini v. Sachs & Sons, 522 P.2d
704, 707 (Utah 1974).
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analysis under the due process clause should not turn on whether a
defendant "consciously desires" the contacts created by his acts in
addition to the acts themselves. Universal application of the rule
would produce absurd results. Consider the case of a defendant
who pollutes in one state knowing that the pollutants will be carried to the forum state. Although the Supreme Court has suggested
that the forum state should have jurisdiction,8 it is unlikely that
the polluter "consciously desires" the pollutants' presence in the
forum; if the polluter has any desire regarding his effluents, it is
probably that they vanish. 5
C. Relevance
Due process also requires that a state may only assert long
arm jurisdiction if the effect caused by the defendant is related to
the cause of action.8 6 Although easily grasped, the concept of a relevant event is difficult to articulate.87 Professor Lea Brilmayer has
suggested a readily applicable test: an event is relevant for jurisdictional purposes if it is substantively relevant to the cause of action.8 This test is grounded on what most agree is the theoretical
justification for the relevancy requirement: only a substantively
relevant event gives the state a legitimate interest in adjudicating
the controversy. 9 It is difficult to imagine a situation where the
state would have such an interest if a substantively relevant event
had not occurred within its borders. 90
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971).
85 Although the purposefulness requirement is inappropriate as a general jurisdictional

guide, part III argues that it is proper to focus on whether the defendant consciously sought

some benefit from his contact with the forum in cases involving interstate commercial
activity.
S. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, combines relevance and causation: "A state has
the power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state
by an act done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising from these effects. . ....
Id. § 37 (emphasis added). See also Reese & Galston, supra note 34, at 264.
87 The cases and the literature provide little guidance to distinguish relevant from irrelevant events. The RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, § 37, requires that the cause of action "arise
from" the effects of the defendant's actions in the forum state, without explaining what that
means. von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 15, at 1144-45, merely state that the cause of
action must "arise out of" or be "intimately related to" the defendant's contacts with the
forum state.
Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 82.
"' See Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring) (due process prevents state from asserting jurisdiction without a "palpable" interest in the controversy that is "rationally connected with forum policy"); Comment, supra
note 16, at 1345-49.
,0 Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 83-84, cites only one lower court opinion in which a
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The suggested test is too broad, however, for not every substantively relevant event gives a state a legitimate interest in asserting jurisdiction over the defendant. Consider again Kulko. Although the Kulkos' marriage while on a California vacation may
not have been a substantively relevant event in an action for child
support, their daughter's conception there undeniably would be.
Yet it would be tenuous to argue that California would have a "legitimate interest" in asserting jurisdiction over Kulko if his daughter had been conceived there during a brief vacation.
In most cases, intuition suffices to distinguish relevant from
irrelevant events. For example, it seems obvious that Kulko's visits
to California years before the child support action arose and his
marriage to Mrs. Kulko during one of those visits could not provide California with jurisdiction over him. 91 Although the
Brilmayer proposal may be as close as one can come to a comprehensive test, it remains necessary to rely on intuition as a general
guide.
III.

ADDITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS: COMMERCIAL
CASES

Constitutional restrictions on the power of states to regulate
certain activities impose additional limitations on state long arm
jurisdiction beyond the minimum due process requirements outlined in part II. For example, it has been suggested that the first
amendment requires limitations on the long arm's reach to avoid
deterring newspapers from disseminating information in foreign
states.92 Similarly, Kulko could be supported on the ground that
substantively irrelevant event has been held to support jurisdiction: Cornelison v. Chauney,
16 Cal. 3d 143, 545 P.2d 264, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1976) (truck driver involved in an accident
on his way to the forum state).
91 The majority opinion acknowledged this inadequacy. 436 U.S. at 92-93.
9' See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966), where the court
refused to assert jurisdiction over the Times where it was alleged to have circulated defamatory articles in Mississippi and Alabama. Reasoning that "First Amendment considerations
surrounding the law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process
clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of activity," id. at 572, the
court held that jurisdiction should only be asserted over an out-of-state newspaper if its
circulation in the forum is sufficient to offset the risk of being subject to suit there. See also
Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967); Buckley v. New York Times
Co., 338 F.2d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1964) (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Carrington & Martin, supra note 16, at 240-43. But see Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584
F.2d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 1978); Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316, 324 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 432 U.S. 911 (1977); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.
1967) (asserting jurisdiction over out-of-state magazine publisher); Comment, Constitu-
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the Constitution limits a state's regulatory power over family matters."3 These explanations rest on the premise that in areas where
the Constitution limits the states' regulatory power, the reach of
long arm jurisdiction should be concomitantly limited so that it
will not impinge unduly on the protected conduct. In the context
of commercial transactions, this part explores the constitutional
justifications for stricter limits on jurisdiction and proposes additional rules that serve these purposes.
A.

Rules Based on the Commerce Clause

The commerce clause 94 requires courts to invalidate state laws
that unreasonably impair interstate commerce.9 5 Thus, a state's
ability to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents who have commercial contacts with its citizens is constrained by "the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which
seriously impede it." 96 Jurisdictional standards may impair commerce in two ways. First, the threat of liability to suit in a foreign
jurisdiction discourages transactions with foreseeable foreign effects. 97 Second, assertion of long arm jurisdiction may frustrate the
tionalLimitations to Long Arm Jurisdictionin Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. CHm. L. REv.
436 (1967).
" Although there is no clear support for such a proposition in the Constitution, several
Supreme Court decisions have held that the Constitution limits the power of a state to
intrude in family affairs. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)
(striking down zoning ordinance limiting occupancy to a single family because it infringed
on "freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life" without a compelling
justification); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 113 (1965) (right to use contraception). See generally Developments in the
Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARv.L. REv. 1156 (1980). At the least, Kulko
clearly stands for the proposition that family concerns deserve special consideration in due
process analysis. Accord, Demarest v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 791, 798, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 641, 644 (1980).
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. See note 47 supra.
The Supreme Court has described the nature of the "dormant commerce clause"
thus:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the commerce clause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, thus affords some protection
from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in such cases, where
Congress has not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the commerce
clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state and national interests.
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See also Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (state highway regulations); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (state highway regulations); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S.
349 (1951) (access of foreign sellers to local markets).
" Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).
97 See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956)
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reasonable expectations of commercial actors, thereby decreasing
commercial certainty.9 8 Although certainty and predictability are
essential in commercial transactions, the permissible reach of long
arm jurisdiction is least well defined in this context.9 9
The constitutional interest in facilitating interstate commerce
seems to require additional jurisdictional limitations beyond the
minimum safeguards of causation, notice, and relevance provided
by due process.1 00 Jurisdiction should not be asserted over a defen-

(Sobeloff, J.) (denying North Carolina jurisdiction over New York manufacturer who
shipped goods to plaintiff in North Carolina):
[T]o sustain jurisdiction here... would involve the danger of grave burdens and impediments to interstate commerce, if the door should be opened to similar legislation
by other States ....
[L]et us consider the hesitancy a California dealer might feel if
asked to sell a set of tires to a tourist with Pennsylvania license plates, knowing that he
might be required to defend in the courts of Pennsylvania.a suit for refund of the
purchase price or for heavy damages in case of accident attributed to a defect in the
tires.
See also Wright v. Yackley, 459 F.2d 287, 291 (9th Cir. 1972) (limiting long arm so as not to
deter out-of-state physicians from rendering medical services to residents); Associated Am.
Artists, Inc. v. Brevard Community College, 508 F. Supp. 292, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (limiting
long arm so as not to deter persons from dealing with forum merchants); Gelineau v. New
York Univ. Hosp., 375 F. Supp. 661, 667-68 (D.N.J. 1974) (limiting long arm so as not to
deter out-of-state physicians from rendering medical services to residents).
It has been suggested, however, that limitations on the long arm cannot ease the overall
deterrence to interstate transactions caused by potential jurisdictional costs, because protecting one party from liability to suit in his opponent's preferred forum merely transfers
the deterrent effect to the latter. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRm & H. KAY, supra note 16, at
551. This criticism is flawed for two reasons. First, in many cases one party will be able to
take protective measures without forgoing the transaction, while the other party will not.
For example, if a mail order house cannot sue foreign purchasers in its home forum, it will
merely increase its insurance and raise prices; it will not abandon the mail order business.
At best, then, the criticism is relevant only in those cases where neither party is able to take
protective measures. Second, a person is more likely to be deterred by the risk of being sued
in a distant forum than by the risk of having to travel to a distant forum to sue. In the
latter situation, the person confronted with the risk at least knows that the decision to bear
the jurisdictional burden is in his own hands.
. The jurisdictional rule offered here can be viewed as analogous to the damages rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 E.R. 145 (1854): both limit legal liability to that
which reasonably could have been anticipated by the defendant and so reduce commercial
risk. Cf. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 138 (1935) (discussing Hadley). Reducing commercial risk or uncertainty facilitates commerce. See, e.g., The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). Cf. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen
Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 233-34 (6th Cir. 1972) (fairness requires the protection of the defendant's reasonable expectations).
"Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 445 U.S. 907, 911 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (confusion of current jurisdictional standards "may well have a disruptive effect on commercial relations in which certainty of results is a prime objective").
100 Others have looked to the commerce clause and the federal interest in facilitating
interstate commerce as grounds for limiting state long arm jurisdiction. See Carrington &
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dant whose conduct is commercial in nature-that is, over one who
puts a product into the stream of commerce or enters into a contract-unless the following two additional conditions are met.
First, the defendant must have been able to anticipate that his
conduct might lead to his being sued in the forum state. Second, in
light of this perceived risk he must have had a reasonable opportunity to alter, without being forced to forgo, the conduct that
caused the effect in the state."'
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the commerce clause
does not prohibit imposition of burdens on nonresident commercial actors where they have an opportunity to pass the burdens
along to residents.1 0 2 The proposed rules ensure that whenever a
Martin, .supranote 16, at 234 (citing cases); Developments, supra note 16, at 983-87; Comment, supra note 16, at 1347-48 & n.59. Cf. Horowitz, The Commerce Clause as a Limitation of State Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 806 (1971) (federal interest in facilitating interstate commerce should be a factor in choice of law decisions).
Prior to International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the commerce
clause was occasionally invoked to deny states jurisdiction over foreign interstate carriers
when the carriers had no lines and operated no service within the forum state, the cause of
action arose outside the forum state, and the plaintiff did not live in the forum wheli the
cause of action accrued. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 287 (1932); Davis v.
Farmers Coop. Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923). See Scanapico v. Richmond, F. & P.
Ry., 439 F.2d 17, 25-28 (2d Cir. 1970) (on reconsideration en banc) (Friendly, J.) (tracing
history of commerce clause limitations on jurisdiction). Cf. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra
note 14, § 12.27 (arguing that the cases "overlap and complement the broader and more
flexible doctrine of forum non conveniens").
This dated line of precedent is inapplicable to the principle argued for here: that the
commerce clause be used to deny a state jurisdiction even where the cause of action is related to the state. See Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200, 207
(1924) (Davis doctrine inapplicable when cause of action is related to the forum); Cardozo,
The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of Jurisdiction,43 CoRNmEU L.Q. 210, 214
(1958).
101 Since World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), a few courts
have held that jurisdiction may be asserted over a defendant who knew his actions might
render him liable to suit in the forum and who had an opportunity to take protective measures in light of that risk. See, e.g., Plant Food Co-op v. Wolfkill Feed & Fertilizer Corp.,
633 F.2d 155, 159-60 (9th Cir. 1980); Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652,
669-70 (lst Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Lachman v. Bank of La., 510 F.
Supp. 753, 757 (N.D. Ohio 1981). In National Egg Co. v. Bank Leumi le-Israel B.M., 504 F.
Supp. 305, 312 (N.D. Ga. 1980), however, the court thought it sufficient that the defendant
could have avoided liability to suit in the forum by forgoing the transaction altogether. Requiring that the defendant relinquish interstate activity to avoid jurisdictional liability
would be impermissible under the rules developed in this comment.
'02 See General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm., 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) (state use
tax may be passed on). See also McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33, 45-46 n.2 (1940) (recognizing the "danger that, to the extent that the burden falls on
economic interests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those political restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely interests within
the state"); Brilmayer, supra note 16, at 95-96 (arguing for restrictions on long arm jurisdic-
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state asserts jurisdiction over an outsider on the basis of a transaction with a resident, the outsider will have had an opportunity to
pass the cost of jurisdictional liability on to the resident.
The first rule embraces in the limited commercial context the
"anticipation of suit" standard rejected in its general application
in part II-B. 03 The second rule protects the same defendants as
the "purposefully avails" standard rejected as a general jurisdictional guide; 10 ' imposition of jurisdictional risks is likely to deter
only those defendants who do not consciously seek benefits from
their commerical contacts with foreign states. The rules provide a
constitutional rationale for limiting jurisdiction where a commercial plaintiff acts unilaterally, without resorting to the artificial
plaintiff-created contacts rule,10 5 and they justify protection of
commercial activities without0 6reliance on nonconstitutionallybased forum interest analyses.
B. Application of the Rules
These rules explain a number of doctrines that courts have developed to limit the long arm in commercial cases. For example,
the rules support the commonly accepted proposition that jurisdiction should not be asserted over an out-of-state merchant who only
occasionally sells to residents of the forum state.10 7 The minimum
due process requirements as formulated in part II pose no obstacle
to jurisdiction if the local merchant has notice that his customer is
an out-of-state resident, yet the merchant would not reasonably
expect that the sale might lead to a suit against him in the buyer's
home state; he is more likely to view his customer's talk of a distant destination as pleasant conversation than as a warning of a
potential inconvenient suit. Moreover, the merchant has no real
opportunity to charge the occasional nonresident a higher price in
light of the unusual jurisdictional risks imposed by the transaction.
The rules also justify the courts' emphasis on the frequency,
regularity, and nature of the commercial defendant's contacts with
tion over out-of-staters who have no opportunity to pass costs on to residents).

See text and notes at notes 71-77 supra.
I" See text and notes at notes 78-85 supra.
,05 See text and notes at notes 55-66 supra.
'0 See text and notes at notes 38-42 supra.
207 See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980) (rejecting foreseeability standard because it would subject local merchants-tire retailers and
soft drink concessionaires-to the jurisdiction of foreign forums); Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 134, 156-57, 273 N.W.2d 811, 820-21 (1978).
103
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the forum state. 108 The existence of transactions between the defendant and forum residents besides the one at issue favors assertion of jurisdiction, because the defendant who regularly does business affecting the forum state has greater warning of the risk of
being sued there and a better chance to alter his conduct in light of
that risk. Similar considerations apply to firms engaged primarily
9
0
in interstate business.

The size of the transaction and the extent of the negotiations
preceding it also are relevant in considering whether the commerce
clause restricts the exercise of the long arm. 10 The courts' concern
with protecting passive purchasers is illustrative."' A passive purchaser buys from a foreign seller's inventory at an unnegotiated
price; 1 2 almost by definition, he is unable to alter the terms of the
transaction. Moreover, most transactions of this sort are so small
that the purchaser has no incentive to diminish the risk of jurisdictional liability rather than simply forgo the transaction entirely.
The transaction costs of, for example, procuring insurance, negotiating a forum selection clause,'13 or altering the price to make acceptance of the risk palatable, are too great to make such restruc108See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. The SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 668-70 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Standard Fittings Co. v. Sapag, S.A., 625 F.2d 630,
642 n.23 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); Voorlas Mfg. Co. v. Mars Signal
Light Co., 481 F. Supp. 828, 830 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Wisconsin Can Co. v. Banite, Inc., 88
F.R.D. 597, 600-01 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893,
904-06, 458 P.2d 57, 65-66, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113, 121-22 (1969).
109 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 15, at 1167-68.
.10 See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 233 (6th Cir.
1972); Galaxy Int'l, Inc. v. White Stores, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 311, 321-22 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Communication Equip. & Contracting Co. v. Anchorage, 498 F. Supp. 632, 634 (M.D. Ala. 1980);
Controlled Metals, Inc. v. Non-Ferrous Int'l Corp., 410 F. Supp. 339, 343 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
121 See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1084, 1085 (1st
Cir. 1973); Architectural Bldg. Components Corp. v. Comfort, 528 P.2d 307, 310 (Okla.
1974).
112 See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 233 (6th Cir. 1972)
("The buyer ... is frequently a relatively passive party, simply placing an order, accepting
the seller's price and terms as stated in his product advertising and agreeing only to pay a
sum upon receipt of the goods or services."). Mail order consumers are a typical example.
See Yankee Metal Prods. Co. v. District Court, 528 P.2d 311, 313 (Okla. 1974) (active/passive purchaser distinction "has the effect of protecting the ordinary 'mail order catalogue'
consumer who merely orders a stock item of merchandise from a distant state, from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the distant state").
13 The Supreme Court upheld the validity of such clauses in National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhert, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). See also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1 (1972).
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turing worthwhile. 114 The long arm therefore must be restricted in
such cases.
On the other hand, when a transaction is for a large amount or
is preceded by lengthy negotiations, the transaction costs of reducing the risk of liability by acquiring insurance or altering the terms
of the bargain become reasonable. Moreover, the more significant
the transaction is, the more likely it is that the parties anticipated
unusual costs; in the absence of a forum selection clause to the
contrary, jurisdiction should be permitted if consistent with minimum due process requirements. Even in passive purchaser situations, failure to restructure the transaction should not automatically suggest an inability to do so, where the transaction is of
considerable magnitude or for unique goods. 11 5
C.

Summary

The rules proposed here strike the proper balance between
state jurisdictional interests and the federal interest in encouraging
interstate commerce. The federal interest is satisfied, because it requires only the protection of those who are unaware that a transaction might lead to suit in the forum and of those who would be
unable to conduct interstate transactions if they had to bear the
risk of jurisdictional liability. The interests of the state are protected, because it may assert jurisdiction over anyone who has significant commercial contacts with it. The interests of commercial
actors also are protected, because they can predict with some certainty where their conduct will render them liable to suit.11 The
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980), the Supreme Court stated that when a commercial defendant "has clear notice that it is subject to
suit [in the forum state it] can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
11'

insurance, passing the expected costs on to customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing
its connection with the state." The rules developed here reject the final alternative, for the
commerce clause requires that commercial actors not be forced to choose between forgoing
an interstate transaction or accepting the risk of being subject to suit in a distant state.
Some protective action short of giving up the transaction must be available.
"' But see Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973),
where three out-of-state defendants each entered into contracts of similar magnitude to
purchase the same goods from the plaintiff. One defendant actively participated in the production process by providing specifications and sending representatives to oversee the process. The other two defendants merely asked for what the first one received. Jurisdiction
was upheld as to the first defendant and denied as to the other two. The rules outlined
above would reject the formalistic active/passive distinction and focus instead on the magnitude and underlying character of the transaction.
"' The rules focus on the reasonable expectations of parties to a transaction. Contrast
Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979),
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rules therefore encourage efficient treatment of potential jurisdictional costs in interstate transactions: when a person is aware of a
potential cost-that is, when he realizes that he and the other
party to a transaction have different jurisdictional preferences-he
must consider that potential cost in structuring the transaction.
CONCLUSION

This comment has argued that the current balancing approach
used in long arm analysis should be replaced with a body of fixed
rules. The proposed rules generally are consistent with the results
of decided cases, but provide a coherent framework for analysis
that emphasizes predictability of result and fidelity to the
Constitution.
Under this analysis, due process in the exercise of the long
arm is provided by minimum requirements of causation, notice,
and relevance. These standards give individuals a sufficient opportunity to avoid a forum's jurisdiction and ensure that the forum
has a legitimate interest in regulating the conduct at issue. These
due process requirements will allow states expansive long arm
power. If further limits on the long arm are imposed, they must be
grounded on a constitutional principle restricting a state's power to
regulate the particular conduct at issue. Using commercial cases as
an illustration, this comment has explored the jurisdictional
ramifications of the negative commerce clause. The implications of
other constitutional guarantees remain for future study.
Mark P. Gergen

cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), denying jurisdiction over a defendant who entered into a
contract that elicited another's performance in the state because performance there was not
required by the contract. The court distinguished between defendants who know a contract
will elicit performance in the forum and those who insist on performance there. Yet both are
equally able to take protective measures in light of the risk of being sued in the forum. The
court argued that absent such a rule, a party to a contract could potentially be liable to suit
wherever the other party chose to perform. 597 F.2d at 603. A party will be liable to suit in
the forum state, however, only when he reasonably might have expected the other party to
perform there. Moreover, the rules offered here would ensure that he had an opportunity to
take protective measures in light of that risk. The Seventh Circuit elevated form over substance by focusing on the formal provisions of the contract rather than on the reasonable
expectations of the parties to the contract. Cf. Note, Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible Application of Long-Arm JurisdictionStandards to
the Nonresident Purchaser,75 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 347 (1980) (criticizing Lakeside Bridge
rule for its rigidity).

